Hybrid Warfare: Inside the Kremlin's Shadow War Playbook
From "little green men" infiltrations to troll farm disinformation campaigns this report will dive into what hybrid warfare is, its fundamental aspects, and why you should know what it is.
April 27, 2007, many Estonians were shocked and confused when they were unable to access their online bank accounts or view the news online. Dozens of websites across many different sectors of Estonian society were rendered inaccessible. This was at the very height of a disagreement with Russia over a Second World War monument commemorating the soldiers of the Red Army who liberated Estonia from the German occupation. Tensions within the nation were at an all-time high between ethnic Russians and Estonians who had clashing views on the statue. On one side the ethnic Russians viewed the statute as a symbol of commemoration for all of the Red Army soldiers who bravely sacrificed their lives for their freedom from brutal Nazi oppression. The Estonians viewed the statue as a symbol of oppression itself, with the Soviet occupation of the nation lasting for 50 years. There were violent riots that led to the death of one person and the injury of many more. This followed a series of instances of espionage and kidnappings of Estonian government officials by Russian FSB agents. This cyber-attack has gone down in history as the second-largest cyber-attack from one nation against another nation’s government. (Remenyi and Ottis) All the factors that led to the culmination of this attack were textbook examples of the Russian hybrid warfare doctrine.
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Ever since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia has been struggling to reclaim its place on the world stage. The Russia of today is quite different from both the former Soviet Union and Russia of 1991. Russia no longer has the economic might it once had, this has led to the former superpower reinventing its war strategy and adapting to its new precarious situation. The Russian government restructured its entire military to better adapt to its new doctrine of hybrid warfare. Hybrid warfare can be defined as the employment of “political warfare and blends conventional warfare, irregular warfare, and cyberwarfare with other influencing methods, such as fake news, diplomacy, lawfare, and foreign electoral intervention.” (Hoffman). There are a multitude of reasons as to why Russia moved in this direction. Russia adopted this new doctrine to assert international influence while avoiding a direct military confrontation with the United States and NATO because Russia does not have the conventional military capability to win a decisive engagement with the West. Hybrid warfare is a term that many in the West are familiar with but lack a proper understanding of what it truly is. Hybrid warfare is not just a simple buzz term or fear-mongering term, rather it is a legitimate military doctrine that is used by our adversaries that target an entire nation’s population. By better understanding what Hybrid Warfare is, we can identify its hallmark methods and better protect ourselves from its dangerous effects.
Hybrid warfare consists of a few different aspects that work in conjunction to achieve a common military or political goal. Hybrid warfare involves the use of both conventional military tactics/strategies and unconventional means. The first and most straightforward aspect of the doctrine is the conventional use of common military tactics and strategy. Russia uses its military as a force of intimidation. This involves highly publicized combined arms military exercises. Russia also uses its military to build up on the borders of neighboring nations such as Ukraine, Georgia, or the Baltic States. In the case of Ukraine, this served two purposes; one was to show the West that the Russian military is a force to be reckoned with and to deter Western support for areas that Russia sees as its sphere of influence, and the second reason was to intimidate Ukraine to deter them from committing all of their forces against the rebels in the Donbas region from 2014 to the dawn of the invasion of Ukraine in 2022. (Trenin) The Russian government has made it quite clear that they intend to move away from Soviet-style equipment that is simple, cheap, and basic in design. Instead, they have quite extensively shown off their new advanced military equipment that is supposed to rival the West such as the T14 tank, Kurganets-25 IFV (Infantry Fighting Vehicle), or the Sukhoi Su-57 multirole fighter. Although the Russian government only possesses this equipment in limited numbers, it has used it to quite the effect in propaganda, flexing its technological prowess and showing the nations of the world that Russia is still a legitimate world power.
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Just because Russia is moving towards newer and more advanced weapons does not mean they do not have a purpose for their older Soviet-era weapon stockpiles. Soviet-era weapons have been seen to be in use by Russian Private Military Contractors in various regions all over the world. PMCs are private companies that provide armed combat or security services for financial gain, they mostly operate on government contracts. Russia uses PMCs to assert influence in contested regions. Libya is the most extreme instance of this. Libya is positioned in a strategically favorable location within the Mediterranean. A CIA report verified heavy Russian influence in the war-torn nation. The authors of the report explained “In May 2020, fourteen unmarked Russian Mig-29 and Su-24 combat aircraft appeared in the possession of Russian paramilitaries in Libya. This transfer was unprecedented. While outdated, the aircraft have air-to-air and ground-attack capabilities like the United States (U.S.) Air Force F-15 and A-10.” (Cragin and Mackenzie). These PMCs give the Russian government plausible deniability so that they can operate in regions where under normal circumstances with traditional soldiers they would be unable to. PMCs supplement Russia’s clandestine special forces units.
A common theme for the Russian government is public appearance versus actual military capability. They rely heavily upon their influence operations to sway public opinion in a way that is favorable for Russia. This is one of the unconventional methods within the hybrid warfare doctrine. Russia has diverted military spending away from the conventional military to highly invest in information operations. “Information operations include interacting with the Global Information Environment and exploiting or denying an adversary's information and decision systems.” (McConville) This includes propaganda campaigns to have Russia be seen in a more favorable light, disinformation campaigns to cause confusion and disunity, and even the targeting of key decision-makers for kidnapping or assassination. Russia’s propaganda abilities are quite extensive and effective. Russia pushes its narrative to win the support of both the citizens of Russia and ethnic Russians living within the former Soviet Republics. Russia has been known to use ethnic Russians outside of Russia to cause instability within former Soviet Republics. Russia also uses these populations as a justification for increased Russian intervention and even annexation of land. Going back to the example of Estonia, Russian state media saw the developing situation between ethnic Russians and Estonians and took full advantage. They escalated tensions by reporting on the disagreement and pushing false information to stoke tension within the nation (Remenyi and Ottis). Russia’s use of disinformation is not only limited to its neighbors.
Russia has been attempting to use disinformation as a conduit for disunity within the West. The most successful attempt at this was the United Kingdom’s exit from the European Union. Russia utilized social media extensively to push false information and to radicalize both sides of the political spectrum. “We found 3,485 tweets from 419 of the accounts listed as IRA accounts which specifically discussed Brexit and related topics such as the EU and migration.” (Llewellyn et al.) The IRA is a Russian company that creates and distributes online propaganda. The Russians use social media to achieve their political ambitions to a devasting effect. With the ever-changing landscape of the internet and social media, it is difficult for common people to decipher what is true, false, and worst of all deliberate propaganda. The Russian disinformation machine is used as a weapon system. It can be used defensively to shield the Russian government from criticism and to effectively control its population. It can also be used offensively as we have seen in both “the Russian sphere of influence” (former Soviet states) and the West (with the United Kingdom being a case in point.)
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Another way Russia has been attempting to achieve its military goals without confrontation with the West is by utilizing cyber-attacks. These cyber-attacks cripple a nation’s ability to effectively coordinate logistics, communication, and support networks. Cyber-attacks can also effectively disrupt a nation’s key energy infrastructure. In our modern age, we rely heavily upon computer networks for all aspects of our society. By targeting these systems, our adversaries can directly degrade a nation’s ability to defend itself without a single shot ever being fired. Russia may also use cyber operations to aid in its disinformation campaigns, such as the forceful acquisition of classified information. It can then broadcast this information through multiple channels to make an adversary look bad, cause confusion, and increase tension between political rivals in an adversary’s nation. The now most infamous example of this was the breach and leakage of Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s classified emails during the 2016 presidential elections (US Department of Justice and Mueller).
With the recent war in Ukraine, we have seen the Russian ability to sway the populations of other nations through economic means. Russia was able to use its natural gas exports as a bargaining chip to lessen sanctions imposed by the West. Many Western European nations rely heavily upon Russian gas. “Overall, and confirming Grigas' analysis of the Russian gas policy, Moscow has been weaponizing its energy supplies for diplomatic purposes and has widened the scope of its victims, while the EU has reduced its Russian gas imports an important policy goal in its non-armed conflict with Russia over Ukraine.” (Lambert et al.) We saw the ramifications of this in Germany in particular. There have been calls in Germany by both politicians and average people advocating for fewer sanctions on Russia and less support for Ukraine. This is due to fears that if Russia cuts off German access to its natural gas there will be an economic crisis in the nation and many German citizens will go cold in the winter. This has been a point of contention within the EU. Germany is by far the largest economy in the EU and without their backing, it would degrade the West’s ability to combat Russian ambitions.
Photo Credit: AP Photo/Dmitry Lovetsky
The United States has seen from its adversaries the benefits of hybrid warfare firsthand. One such benefit is being able to achieve its international ambitions without a direct military confrontation. Back in 2014, the Russians were able to do this with minimal resistance. They utilized a combination of information operations, special forces soldiers, and private military contractors to annex the region of Crimea from Ukraine. Once the true details of the annexation surfaced, the West was shocked and paranoid by Russia’s “Little Green Men.” (Sukhankin) The Russians stealthily inserted many groups of special forces soldiers. These soldiers did not wear a proper uniform and their principal objective was to disrupt any potential Ukrainian military response in the region. They did this by using electronic warfare to disrupt and degrade Ukrainian military communications. The Russians also covertly inserted many PMCs into the region. These PMCs would pose as Ukrainian civilians and create unrest in the region. Each group of PMCs had their objectives for example the “Heroes with baseball bats.” Though portrayed by Russian information outlets as “ordinary protesters,” “self-defense” squads or members of “Voluntary People’s Druzhina,” these lightly armed gangs were, in fact, well-organized groups of middle-aged men…. initially assembled in Russia.” (Sukhankin) After the unrest in the region turned to violent clashes between the Ukrainian authorities and these so-called “protestors”, the Russians seized the opportunity to invade the region to restore order and to protect ethnic Russians from being targeted by the Ukrainian authorities. Soon after a sham referendum was held allowing Russia to annex the region. This annexation was only met with harsh condemnations from the world. It seemed at the time; that Russia was able to annex an entire region of a neighboring sovereign nation with little more than a slap on the wrist.
The annexation of Crimea displayed the effectiveness of using many new technological advancements in conjunction with conventional military assets. The hybrid warfare doctrine was specifically developed by the Russians to better utilize the technological advancements since the Cold War. The Russians already had an appreciation for how influential information campaigns can be. This is due to the extensive propaganda and disinformation system the Soviets developed back in 1917. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russians saw the value of the internet, and specifically social media, for its influence operations. The Russians have a very distinct view, separate from the United States in which, they see the social media revolutions of the 21st century as something that would have been impossible before the advent of the internet and social media. (Taylor and Clark) The effects of these revolutions are desirable for the Kremlin. One such effect is regime change. Previously the Soviets and even more recently the United States would accomplish this with an invasion. For example, the invasion of Afghanistan first by the Soviet Union and then the United States. Now a nation does not have to invade another nation to force a regime change. Instead, they can simply use social media to influence the target nation’s population to adopt more policies friendly to them, or even a complete overthrow of the sitting regime. Think of the 2011, Arab Spring where countries like Tunisia were able to overthrow their sitting government without a major conventional conflict erupting.
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Small countries are not the only ones vulnerable to massive instability brought on by social media. The United States was itself, shaken by a now infamous social media disinformation campaign by the Russians in the 2016 presidential election. On election day of 2016 within the top 10 accounts with the most activity, was the fake GOP Tennessee Twitter account. This account was used by the Russians to spread false information. The effectiveness of this account was astronomical with multiple tweets being retweeted by “multiple Trump Campaign officials and surrogates, including Donald J. Trump, Jr., Eric Trump, Kellyanne Conway, Brad Parscale, and Michael T. Flynn." (US Department of Justice and Mueller) If the United States had more heavily invested in information operations it would have been better suited to identify this threat and to combat it. The key aspect to deny an adversary the advantage in hybrid warfare is within the informational realm. “The Kremlin’s information campaign is its center of gravity in each hybrid war. The United States cannot win hybrid wars with Russia if it loses in the information space.” (Clark) Ever since the 2016 presidential election, the United States has seen immense political polarization and increased domestic instability.
Some argue that hybrid warfare is not a clearly defined doctrine, and it is simply a new buzzword created by the West. They say that all the previously discussed aspects of the doctrine have been used before. The Russians' use of information operations and cyber operations has never been the focus of the Russian military but rather a precursor to its conventional military operations. Critics claim that hybrid warfare cannot be the future of warfare because it has always existed. For example, during the Soviet Union’s failed invasion of Afghanistan, the Soviets utilized Muslim soldiers from neighboring Central Asian Soviet republics to infiltrate the Mujahadeen and to cause confusion. Additionally, Dr. Nicu Popescu, a diplomat and senior analyst for the European Union Institute for Security Studies discussed that the Russians had such success in Ukraine in 2014 not because of their doctrine, but due to the weakened state of the Ukrainian government to defend itself. He argued that when the Russians dropped their use of hybrid warfare to use a more conventional approach such as the shelling of Ukrainian positions in Eastern Ukraine it demonstrated the ineffectiveness of hybrid warfare as a doctrine. He believed that the West must be aware of Russian conventional military strategies to properly counter them, rather than worrying about hybrid warfare as this new existential threat.
I argue that while Dr. Popescu had a good understanding of what hybrid warfare is, he wholly underestimated the threat posed by the Russian implementation of the doctrine. The mere existence and use of aspects of hybrid warfare such as the clandestine use of special forces does not signify the actual implementation of hybrid warfare. Conventional military force is used in conjunction with the other aspects, they are not two separate things. We have seen hybrid warfare tactics used in the past but not all of them together simultaneously until recently. The use of all these different tactics together is what constitutes hybrid warfare. The Russians themselves clearly stated their intentions with hybrid warfare. “It [Russia] instead argues that conventional war is a legacy type of conflict that is increasingly unlikely in the 21st century due to technological changes and strategic power balances. The Kremlin further asserts that Russia should shape its military and national security tools to optimize for hybrid wars not only because they are increasingly common, but also because they are now more practical and effective than traditional conventional warfare.” (Clark) It would be foolish to write off hybrid warfare as a simple buzz term to stoke fears in the West. Hybrid warfare is not just a theoretical doctrine, we have seen its use firsthand in conflicts across the globe.
Other critics acknowledge hybrid warfare as a legitimate doctrine, but they cast serious doubts on its effectiveness. The world saw the monstrous failures of the implementation of the doctrine in the conflict with Ukraine. The Russians have shown the world that their use of this doctrine has only led to a crushing crunch in their economy and isolation on the world stage. The weaponization of natural resources backfired spectacularly for the Russian state. The Russians’ threats of decreasing its exportation of natural gas have forced its main importer, the EU to seek more secure energy resources. (Lambert et al.) In the long term, this is terrible for the Russian economy. This is because the EU can trade with a vast number of other countries, while Russia cannot. Russia would be forced to directly compete with other oil producers because they must sell their gas at significantly below the market rate due to sanctions. The sanctions brought on by the West just further isolate Russia's economy from the rest of the global market. This economic influence by Russia was only a one-time use strategy. If this strategy were to succeed, then why would Europe continue to trade with the Russians knowing that at any time they can interfere with their energy supply? This can be viewed as a strategic blunder by Russia. A simple last-ditch attempt at regaining the intuition.
The Russians’ failure to leverage their natural gas as a weapon against the West is not a failure of hybrid warfare itself. The Russians are the ones to blame for not properly considering the risk-to-reward ratio when using their main export as a weapon. It is their fault for not diversifying their economy. In hindsight using your only export that props up your economy as a weapon is plain foolish. However, we have also seen that the sanctions of the West were not as effective as they may have been foreseen. The Russians were able to circumvent the brunt of sanctions by increasing trade with India and China, specifically in natural gas exports. “India stepped in to fill the gaps that emerged from lost trade. For example, oil imports from Russia grew from around 600,000 tons in the first quarter of 2022, to over 8.4 million tons in the second.” (Ker-Lindsay) The Russians may have failed in forcing the West to cease support for Ukraine, but they have inadvertently deepened their alliances with other nations such as China and India. Thus, the Russian use of its natural gas exports still provides it with valuable influence in the global economy, despite being heavily sanctioned.
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The Russians’ failure to control the media narrative surrounding their armed forces and failures in Ukraine demonstrate the ineffectiveness of hybrid warfare. To lose in the informational realm demonstrates that too much of the doctrine’s success relies upon one factor. After Russia announced a partial mobilization, we have seen public support wane for the war. A survey taken after the announcement stated only 23% of the Russian citizens surveyed responded that they felt pride in reaction to the mobilization. There have been as many as 700,000 Russian citizens who fled Russia in response to the mobilization order. (Cappelluto) Despite the Russian state-controlled media’s best efforts, they are losing rapidly on the information front. These conscripts are not motivated to fight and are actively protesting their conditions. What makes the situation worse is that these soldiers have access to social media. All the things that the soldiers are posting are seriously damaging the Russian war effort.
All of this demonstrates the importance of information operations and why there should be more training in this aspect of hybrid warfare. This situation only highlights the importance of hybrid warfare. The Russians would not be in this same situation thirty years ago. However, due to technological advancements such as smartphones and social media, the Russian armed forces have been forced into a peculiar situation. It would be foolish to argue that due to the doctrine’s reliance on success in information operations, it should be disregarded. If anything, it shows that the flow of information and public opinion is now intimately linked to the success of military operations. The Russians failed to properly train, equip, and provide their soldiers with a purpose to fight. They also failed to use information operations properly which led to their downfall. For example, their lack of operational security allowed these conscripts to post on social media freely showing their abhorrent conditions. This also shows that all aspects of the hybrid warfare doctrine must work together for there to be success. If one aspect fails (in this case the conventional Russian armed forces) then the other aspects will also fail. This is because all the other aspects are meant to supplement the conventional armed forces, not replace them.
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The Russian doctrine of hybrid warfare has seen relative success and has forced the West to reflect upon its doctrine and capabilities to better combat the Russian threat. The West and in particular the United States must revise their views on hybrid warfare. The face of warfare has forever changed. Technological advancements have ushered in a new era of warfare. Now both civilians and military analysts can see high-definition footage of battles in Ukraine a mere couple of days after they have occurred, sometimes as little as hours. We must take the lessons learned in Ukraine and other Russian operations with the utmost seriousness. The West must remain united to combat the Russian threat. We must be prepared for both conventional means and unconventional means to adapt to this new way of fighting. Hybrid warfare has shown that a nation can be of a great threat without directly confronting an adversary. There has been a shift in military strategy that encompasses the entirety of a nation’s resources. We, however, must not forgo traditional military methods, when a military is neglected, there will be disastrous results. The Russians have demonstrated this clearly with the invasion of Ukraine grinding to a stalemate. We should all be concerned with this new way of fighting, not just generals or highly ranked government officials as it affects everyone in a nation when targeted. The era of conflict between nations being only contained to battlefields is long over. War has truly become total; it is now waged on all fronts against all peoples of an adversary nation. From massive disinformation campaigns to economic stress to crippling cyber-attacks the stability of the nations of the world are at risk.
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