Power and Repression: The Maduro Regime’s Control Mechanisms in Post-Election Venezuela
An analysis of how the politicization and decentralization of the Venezuelan military ensure unwavering loyalty to the Maduro regime.
Venezuela is in the midst of political chaos following the supposedly “free and fair” elections of the Maudro regime as promised in the Barbados Agreement of 2023 (Crisis Group, 2023). Although hardly surprising, the Maduro regime claimed victory in one of the most painfully evident cases of electoral fraud in the country’s history. Almost immediately after signing the Barbados Agreement in October 2023, the Maduro regime reneged on its promises and set the gears of repression in motion. For example, in December 2023, the Maduro regime caused international apprehension when it held an illegal referendum on the fate of the disputed Essequibo region of its neighbor Guyana. Maduro used this referendum to gauge how much support he could drum up from his base and as a blueprint for electoral fraud in future elections. The Maduro regime also harassed the opposition through a systematic lawfare approach. Dozens of opposition staff members and leaders were arbitrarily arrested by the regime and the main opposition candidate, Maria Corina Machado, was barred from running for election, leaving the opposition scrambling to find a candidate they could stand in her place (Berg & Hernandez-Roy, 2024). On the eve of the election, Maduro prohibited international observers from monitoring the election and he reduced Venezuelan embassy staff overseas to prevent the Venezuelan diaspora from casting their votes. (Berg & Hernandez-Roy, 2024). On voting day there were numerous allegations of voter suppression and of the regime blocking attempts at verifying the vote. Even in some cases, voting centers were held at gunpoint buying time for the regime to falsify votes to secure the election for itself (Berg & Hernandez-Roy, 2024).
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Now thousands of Venezuelans have taken to the streets to ferociously protest against the regime's blatant attempts to steal the election. The Venezuelan opposition has not conceded and is rallying the people to reject the Maduro regime's grip on power. However as it stands now, the people alone can not secure power from the chavista’s iron grip on the country. Without significant backing from the military, the opposition cannot remove Maduro from power. The military has made it clear that it stands with Maduro and it will crush any dissent. The Venezuelan defense minister, Vladimir Padrino López, accused the opposition of attempting a coup and vowed to crack down on any dissent in the country (Kahn & Otis, 2024). So the question remains; despite the horrid economic conditions and clear mismanagement by the government why does the military remain loyal to Maduro?
Well before Maduro took power in Venezuela the Chavista regime worked tirelessly to secure the loyalty of the armed forces. It restructured the military to be used as a tool of the regime to defend its monopoly on power from threats within the country rather than outside of it. Former President Hugo Chávez worked closely with Cuban intelligence to establish the General Directorate of Military Counterintelligence, an organization that served as a check on the military’s power and influence. It was able to police the ranks of the military, quickly identifying and purging any elements of disloyalty. Deeply embedded within the barracks and offices of the armed forces, intelligence agents created an atmosphere of paranoia, with even high-ranking officers being arrested by secret police for the slightest of perceived infractions. Additionally, the regime ensured ideological loyalty within the ranks and heavily politized the armed forces. After he was elected president in 1998, Chávez sought to transform the military into a "revolutionary" force aligned with his socialist ideals. Soldiers are required to participate in "revolutionary debates" and educational sessions focusing on the benefits of Venezuela's socialist system. These sessions aim to instill loyalty to the ruling party and its ideology. The military curriculum includes discussions on Chávez's ideas and the historical context of his rise to power, often portraying him as a liberator from oppression. The military is also exposed to propaganda that depicts the United States as an imperialist enemy and the opposition as traitors, fascists, and imperialists. This serves to create an "us vs. them" mentality, positioning the military as the defender of the Revolution and the opposition as ideological enemies. Emphasis is placed on historical events like the Vietnam War and Operation Condor, presenting them as evidence of U.S. interventionism and the threat of imperialism (Forerro, 2024).
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The Chávez and Maduro regimes have strategically developed parallel military forces to ensure loyalty and maintain control over the country. This approach has involved creating ideologically aligned units that can counterbalance the traditional military branches, thus preventing any single group from amassing too much power. This decentralization of power within the military serves to protect the regime from internal threats and reinforces its grip on the armed forces. The Guardia Nacional (National Guard) was expanded significantly after 2011 to enhance the regime's internal security capabilities (Trinkunas, 2021), Focused more on internal security, the Guardia Nacional is lighter-armed than the army but has superior training. The Guardia Nacional has remained a key tool for maintaining internal order and suppressing dissent. The Bolivarian Militia is a highly politicized force mainly consisting of part-time volunteers with limited training and poor equipment. It potentially numbers in the hundreds of thousands, making it a significant force that can be mobilized if the regime feels threatened. The militia's ideological indoctrination is emphasized, with members being taught loyalty to the Revolution and the ideals of Chávez and Maduro.
The decentralization of the Venezuelan armed forces is most exemplified by its officer corps. Venezuela has approximately 2,000 admirals and generals, which is disproportionately high compared to the size of its armed forces (Ellsworth & Armas, 2019). For comparison, Venezuela has twice as many general officers as the United States, despite having only 150,000 active personnel compared to nearly 1 million in the U.S. military. This inflation of the officer ranks has resulted in a jumbled and partisan chain of command, where officers are often more focused on pleasing Socialist Party leaders to maintain their positions and privileges rather than concentrating on national defense. The promotion of officers is largely based on loyalty to the regime rather than merit or military capability, ensuring that those in power are unwaveringly supportive of the government.
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The large number of officers also means that power is diluted across many individuals, making it difficult for any single officer to amass enough influence or resources to stage a coup. This fragmentation of authority within the military creates a system where officers are unable to coordinate effectively against the regime. Furthermore, the presence of multiple high-ranking officers with overlapping responsibilities often leads to confusion about who holds ultimate authority in military and civilian matters. This situation ensures that the military remains loyal to President Maduro because the officers are deeply enmeshed in a web of patronage and self-enrichment opportunities tied to the regime. Officers in civilian roles or those running state companies benefit from the system through nepotism and corruption, making them resistant to any political transition that might threaten their positions and privileges. According to Transparencia Venezuela, military officers lead at least 60 of the 576 state-run companies, including PDVSA, the state oil company. As of January 2019, nine out of 32 government ministries, including agriculture and energy, were controlled by the military. The military played a crucial role in the exploitation of the food supply, benefiting from a complex currency system that allowed officers to import food at favorable exchange rates. They then sold these goods on the black market at significantly higher prices, creating lucrative opportunities for personal enrichment.
Even the average rank-and-file soldier is more well off compared to their civilian counterparts due to state-sponsored corruption. Groups of soldiers could easily establish checkpoints to extort bribes from the locals and have easy access to black-market goods. State-sponsored drug trafficking and illicit enrichment have become entrenched within the Venezuelan military and political system. The Cartel of the Suns is named after the sun insignias worn by Venezuelan military generals and officers. It has evolved into a criminal patronage network that supports the Maduro regime by providing economic benefits to loyal military and political allies. This system is less of a centralized network and more of a collection of regional military-political-criminal nodes. Each node operates semi-autonomously, managing its local affairs with the implicit backing of the national government. Numerous senior members of the Chavista political movement, including President Maduro himself, have been accused of participating in or benefiting from the cartel (InSight Crime, 2023). The cartel is involved in drug trafficking, arms smuggling, fuel smuggling, illegal mining, black markets, kidnapping, and extortion. Military personnel participate in these activities by accepting bribes to ignore trafficking operations, facilitating the movement of drugs, and controlling key infrastructure like ports and airports. The Venezuelan military has also been accused of working side by side with leftist paramilitary groups that operate across the porous border with Colombia. For years, the National Liberation Army (ELN) has operated with near-total impunity in Venezuela, particularly in the border regions and the Orinoco mining arc, due to its ties with local government and security forces. Unconfirmed Venezuelan intelligence leaks suggest that military units are instructed not to attack Colombian guerrilla groups on the border, instead providing them with logistical support. (InSight Crime, 2020)
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The relationship between the ELN and Venezuela’s Bolivarian National Guard (GNB) appears to be one of criminal convenience and profiteering. The groups collaborate in fuel smuggling operations in Apure, with the ELN paying “taxes” to the GNB in Amazonas and Bolívar for the protection of illegal mines. However, this alliance is not without conflict. There have been disputes over the division of criminal profits, leading to violent clashes. For example, in late 2018, the capture of alleged ELN commander Luis Felipe Ortega Bernal, known as “Garganta,” resulted in a confrontation between the military and the guerrillas, leaving four GNB members dead. (InSight Crime, 2020)
All of this goes to say that Maduro was confident that he would have the military on his side following the election. Maduro's strategy is centered on consolidating his power while managing both internal dissent and international relations. Domestically, Maduro relies on severe repression, deploying the National Police, the National Guard, and regime-aligned criminal gangs to suppress protests and maintain control. High-profile opposition leaders have been targeted for arrest and harassment, aiming to weaken the opposition and discourage further dissent. Maduro could escalate repression, following the model of the Ortega-Murillo regime in Nicaragua, to ensure his regime's survival. Maduro is betting on the exhaustion of the Venezuelan people, calculating that public fatigue from years of crisis will lead to short-lived unrest that he can manage with limited resources.
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On the international front, Maduro seeks to bolster his position by engaging with leftist allies such as Colombia and Brazil (Berg & Hernandez-Roy, 2024). He is trying to convince these countries to endorse his regime despite allegations of electoral fraud, emphasizing that stability under his rule is preferable to the chaos he claims would ensue from a democratic transition. Maduro's strategy includes leveraging the fear of increased migration to pressure neighboring countries, which already host millions of Venezuelan refugees.
Maduro's strategy to maintain control in Venezuela hinges on a combination of severe internal repression, strategic manipulation of international relations, and the consolidation of military loyalty. The Maduro regime’s blatant electoral fraud and subsequent violent suppression of dissent reflect a pattern of entrenched authoritarianism that aims to stifle opposition and secure the regime’s grip on power. By leveraging the military’s loyalty, cultivated through years of ideological indoctrination, patronage, and corruption, Maduro seeks to outlast the current wave of unrest similar to previous waves of unrest in 2017 and 2019. However, the current protests, driven by both traditional opposition groups and a new, broader segment of society, could strain the regime's ability to maintain control without resorting to even more severe measures.
References
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